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Abstract
The pursuit of explaining and improving generalization in deep learning has elicited efforts both in regularization
techniques as well as visualization techniques of the loss surface geometry. The latter is related to the intuition
prevalent in the community that flatter local optima leads to lower generalization error. In this paper, we harness
the state-of-the-art “filter normalization” technique of loss-surface visualization to qualitatively understand the
consequences of using adversarial training data augmentation as the explicit regularization technique of choice.
Much to our surprise, we discover that this oft deployed adversarial augmentation technique does not actually result
in “flatter” loss-landscapes, which requires rethinking adversarial training generalization, and the relationship
between generalization and loss landscapes geometries.
1. Introduction
State of the art deep learning models that exhibit low generalization error intriguingly exist in the regime where the number
of trainable parameters in the model is often greater than the number of training data points. In order to address the
susceptibility of such models to over-fitting, there exists a formidable body of literature of regularization techniques, which
broadly fall into two categories. The first category is implicit regularization (Neyshabur, 2017) that includes examples such
as early stopping during training or small-norm solution inducing Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). The second category
is explicit regularization that includes techniques such as using `1 or `2-norm weight penalty, training data augmentation,
architectural changes (such as introducing skip connections) and dropouts. Training data augmentation based explicit
regularization in turn falls into two categories. The first entails usage of classical hand-crafted transformations such as
elastic transformation, random cropping, perturbations of image attributes such as brightness and contrast, and synthetic
oversampling. The second entails harnessing adversarial perturbations to augment the dataset (Kurakin et al., 2016). The
work presented in this paper fits squarely into this second category, that is also termed adversarial training.
Co-temporal to this evolution of regularization techniques for deep learning, has been the quest to both qualitatively and
quantitatively investigate the nexus between the geometry of the loss-landscape (flatness of the local optima) and the ability
of regularized-model to generalize well (Li et al., 2018). Combining these two potent and hitherto unconnected set of ideas,
in this paper, we seek to qualitatively address the following question:
“What happens to the loss surface of deep-nets
when we use explicit regularization using adversarial data augmentation?”
Guided by the pre-eminent merits of adversarial training, our ansatz at the beginning of this experimental work was that
we would encounter mild to impressive flattening of the loss surfaces. Much to our surprise, our findings did not meet this
expectation, which requires rethinking generalization (Zhang et al., 2016) in the context of adversarial training. Our work
also provides an experimental approach from other work with theoretical perspectives on the notion of adversarial training
(Raghunathan et al., 2019).
Through this dissemination, we’d like to call upon the community at large to further investigate this finding and have duly
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open sourced all our code1 in order to accelerate reproducibility and experimentation. This is a work in progress and we are
actively updating the repository with more experiments.
2. Methods and Experiments
2.1. Adversarial Attacks
We experiment with adversarially augmented training data using three different common attacks, with all three attacks
using the `∞ metric. The first is the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) as an `∞-bounded adversary, which computes an
adversarial sample xadv from x (Goodfellow et al., 2014) by modifying the input data to maximize the loss based on the
backpropagated gradients with some perturbation , which can be expressed as:
xadv = x+ sgn (∇xL(θ, x, y)) . (1)
Secondly, we consider projected gradient descent (PGD) as a more powerful adversary, which is considered a “universal”
first-order technique and is essentially a multi-step variant FGSMk with random starts (Kurakin et al., 2016)(Madry et al.,
2017):
xt+1adv = Clip
(
xt + αsgn (∇xL(θ, x, y))
)
. (2)
Thirdly, we use the Spatially Transformed Adversarial Attack (stAdv) that crafts more perceptually realistic attacks by
modifying image geometry (Xiao et al., 2018) and changing the positions of pixels. Instead of directly changing pixel values,
these adversaries optimize the amount of displacement in each dimension, i.e. the flow vector fi = (∆u(i),∆v(i)). Each
pixel value from input location (u(i), v(i)) corresponds to a flow-displaced pixel in the adversarial image:
(u(i), v(i)) =
(
u
(i)
adv + ∆u
(i), v
(i)
adv + ∆v
(i)
)
. (3)
Since these locations can be fractional coordinates, each adversarial pixel x(i)adv is calculated through bilinear interpolation of
N neighboring pixels:
x
(i)
adv =
∑
q∈N(u(i),v(i))
x(q)
(
1− |u(i) − u(q)|
)(
1− |v(i) − v(q)|
)
. (4)
2.2. Adversarial Training
We experiment with a standard ResNet-32 model architecture (He et al., 2016). As a base model, we first train a clean model
on the original CIFAR10 dataset until convergence. Then, for each attack, we generate a single (untargeted) adversarial
example per training point in the original dataset, such that the new augmented dataset has a one-to-one ratio of clean and
adversarial samples. The base model is then fine-tuned for 200 epochs on the augmented dataset, with the learnt weights
then used for loss landscape visualizations.
We recognize and want to highlight that this choice of training procedure likely has an impact on the results we obtain. In
particular, pretraining and then performing adversarial fine-tuning may result in a different loss landscape than performing
adversarial training from scratch. We investigate this training procedure because we are interested in how much adversarial
training can increase robustness relative to existing trained models, potentially as part of a multi-step process to improve
model generalization. However, we are also interested in and encourage future exploration of loss landscapes of models
adversarially trained from scratch.
2.3. Loss Landscape Visualization
Traditional 2D contour plots visualize the change in loss moving from some center point θ∗ (e.g. the optimization minimum)
out along any two direction vectors δ and η:
f(α, β) = L(θ∗ + αδ + βη) (5)
Since naively adding these direction vectors to θ∗ (which can vary greatly in magnitude model to model) sacrifices the scale
invariance of network weights, we normalize the direction vectors d by the Frobenius norm of the filter:
di,j =
di,j
||di,j || ||θi,j || (6)
1https://github.com/joycex99/adversarial-training
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(d) stAdv augmentation
Figure 1. Visualizations of loss landscapes of the same model. (b)-(d) are losses fine-tuned augmented data from different attacks.
Table 1. Top-1 Accuracies for Original and Adversarially-Augmented Data
AUGMENTED
WITH
GROUND
ACC.
ADVERSARIAL
ACC.
FGSM PGD STADV
NONE 92.64 16.88 0.0 0.0
FGSM 90.11 75.23 12.11 0.0
PGD 87.34 60.52 51.20 13.85
STADV 91.05 55.84 52.98 25.49
where di,j is the jth filter of the ith layer of d (Li et al., 2018).
With this modification, even if the adversarial models converge upon different magnitudes of weights, the relative curvatures
and geometry of their loss landscapes are directly comparable.
3. Results and Visualizations
We evaluate original and augmented models on Top-1 accuracy on both the original test data and adversarial inputs. We
use FGSM with the `∞ radius of 8/255, PGD with radius 1/255 for 10 iters, and stAdv with radius 0.3/64. The relative
robustness of our adversarially-trained models supports accuracies as reported by existing literature (Xiao et al., 2018).
Surprisingly, the loss landscape geometries do not follow intuition of common practices. Since adversarial training has
been shown to improve generalization, and models with low generalization error tend to have smoother loss landscapes, we
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Figure 2. 3D Visualizations of loss landscapes of the same model. (b)-(d) are losses fine-tuned augmented data from different attacks.
originally expected adversarially-trained nets to have smoother loss landscapes, fewer local minima and greater convexity.
However, the clean model (trained on the original data) appears to have the smoothest/most convex loss landscape (Fig
1(a)). Meanwhile, the FGSM-augmented model has the sharpest/least convex geometry, followed by PGD and then
the comparatively smoother stAdv (Fig 1(b), 1(c), 1(d)), which supports the idea that adversarial training actually hurts
generalization through through trade-offs between the standard accuracy and adversarially robust accuracy of a model
We also note that there is a positive correlation between the smoothness/convexity of the adversarial loss landscapes and
the relative similarity between their perturbed images and the originals. Table 2 shows the average difference of perturbed
images from the original for each attack, measured by 1 - SSIM (the Structural SIMilarity index) (Flynn et al., 2013)(Wang
et al., 2004). Our results demonstrate that smaller 1-SSIM differences correspond to smoother loss landscapes. Specifically,
models trained on stAdv perturbations - which intentionally modify image geometry as opposed to arbitrary pixel values -
have the smoothest adversarial loss landscape. Meanwhile, training on FGSM-perturbed images that have lower structural
similarity to the original results in a particularly sharp and chaotic landscape.
Table 2. Average SSIM Distance of Adversary from Original
DATA AUGMENTED WITH 1-SSIM
FGSM 0.049344
PGD 0.008206
STADV 0.002801
4. Conclusion
The loss landscape geometries of adversarially-trained neural networks reveal that overall model generalization does not
necessarily improve with resilience to certain attacks. The sharper loss landscapes of adversarially-trained models are not
only an unintuitive, surprising result for ongoing model interpretability efforts, but an important point of consideration for
Understanding Adversarial Robustness Through Loss Landscape Geometries
developing new adversarial training techniques.
Fine-tuning models on augmented data may also contribute to sharper and more chaotic local minima, since the optimization
path from former local minima can differ from the optimization path from randomly initialized weights. Once again, we
encourage further investigation in comparing our results to those obtained from non-pretrained models.
Based on our investigations, out of our three adversarial augmentations, stAdv shows the most promise in terms of accuracy
and generalization abilities. Even so, under adversarial fine-tuning, we show models can default to memorizing perturbations
and generalizing only based on structural image similarity (Yuan et al., 2019)(Zhang & Jiang, 2018). It is possible that
combining multiple attack methods might improve overall generalization and converge upon relatively flat loss landscapes,
and is a potential avenue for future investigation.
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